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through the meddling of foreign "extremists" from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan. Rashid Kadyrov, the Uzbek prosecutor general, said of the 29-30 March 2004 Tashkent bombings, for example, "The character and method of this act is not common to our people . . . It was probably exported from abroad."
3 Problematically, however, while these clash of civilizations and foreign intervention arguments may capture part of the cause, they nevertheless treat Islamist opposition as an undifferentiated whole. That is, they provide few insights into why some Islamist movements are more militant and why conflict between the state and Islam is greater in some countries than in others. In this essay I directly address this variation. More specifically, I seek to explain why tensions between the state and Islam have proven greaterand considerably more violent-in Uzbekistan than they have in Kyrgyzstan. Through a comparison of Islamist movements in these two countries, I find that international variables, be they the encroachment of foreign cultures or foreign missionaries and foreign financial support, indeed are important to the spread of political Islam in Central Asia. The varying strength of the Islamist movements, however, is a result of decidedly local politics. Political Islam in Central Asia is a response to autocratic rule. And, problematically for the West and its newfound allies among the Central Asian leadership, the more autocratic this rule is, the greater resonance and popular support militant Islamist movements gain. This article, in sum, provides an explanation for local-level variations in political Islam. To achieve this, I proceed in four steps. In section one I discuss the literature on political Islam and outline the insights this literature holds for the current spread of political Islam in Central Asia. In section two I compare these leading hypotheses to the domestic-level explanation I offer in contrast. In section three, I illustrate how, while the international context is important to social mobilization, the marked variation we see in Central Asian Islamist movements cannot be explained without reference to domestic politics. Comparing the Uzbek and Kirghiz cases, I demonstrate how differences in the degree of autocratic rule shape both the resonance and the militancy of Islamist opposition. Lastly, in section four, I conclude by exploring the implications this finding presents both for Central Asian politics and for broader international relations.
The Comparative Study of Political Islam

Origins and Clashes
Political Islam, though recent to Central Asia, has long provided a language of mobilization for opponents of autocratic rule in Middle Eastern, North African, and Southeast Asian countries. Political Islam as first conceived in the 1950s was a response to the "nationalist and chauvinistic ideologies that have appeared in modern times."
4 Mid-twentiethcentury Islamists viewed the Middle East's postcolonial nationalist governments, along with their Western and Soviet backers, as "sterile," "defeated," and "degenerate." 5 Instead of freedom, they argued, postcolonial independence brought servitude. The Middle East's postcolonial nationalist governments, Islamist writers like Sayyid Qutb believed, introduced a new form of domination, which simply made "some men lords over others." 6 Qutb, seen as a threat by Egypt's Nasser government, was hanged in 1966. His ideas, however, particularly his belief that through a return to Koranic law, through "the Islamic way of life . . . all men become free from the servitude of some men to others," have continued to inspire Islamists throughout the world.
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Qutb and his contemporaries pointedly contrasted this Islamic ideal to what they saw as the "humiliation of the common man" at the hands of distinctly Western forms of governance-nationalism, communism, and democracy. 8 For many scholars and Islamists to- clash of civilisations is an inevitable matter. . . . Make the preparations required for the conflict, since the Capitalist Western civilisation has knocked you down militarily, politically and economically; however they will never defeat you intellectually." Islam comfortably meet and where the boundary between the two is imperceptible.
If not a clash of civilizations though, what then explains the recent increase in political Islam in regions like Central Asia and the Middle East? In the remainder of the essay I discuss two alternative theories to the clash of civilizations:
(1) the idea that the growth of political Islam is the product of radical intervention on the part of transnational Islamist activists, and (2) the hypothesis that the upsurge in political Islam is a grassroots response to local authoritarian rule. The first hypothesis views political Islam as something that is alien, fomented by radicals from the outside. The second hypothesis-the logic that I argue is driving the growth of Islamism in Central Asia-sees political Islam as indigenous, varied, and instrumental-as a rational and powerful strategy for opposing autocratic rule.
Foreign Extremists
Evidence from Chechnya, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and now Iraq confirms that foreign nationals are active in promoting a wide spectrum of Islamist-based mobilization movements. Al Qaeda, to take but one example, has supported militant Islamist movements in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Lebanon, Jordan, Malaysia, Pakistan, 27 and now in Iraq. 28 Thus, it is understandable that leaders the world over publicly denounce the intervention of foreign Islamists in domestic affairs. What is less understandable, however, is the claim these leaders often make-that the spread of political Islam is a direct product of foreign intervention and not a domestic response to local authoritarian rule.
Gauging the extent of foreign Islamic activity in a country is difficult. While many foreign Islamic activists are visible, working openly with neighborhood communities and, much like Christian missionary groups, establishing schools that incorporate religious teaching along with general education, a substantial portion of foreign aid, particularly aid to what state leaders label "radical" Islam, occurs outside of public view. Thus, the measures that we do have of foreign actors promoting Islamist movements are incomplete and, when reported by governments, often biased.
The Kirghiz and Uzbek governments, as well as the leaderships in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, have all claimed that the activities of foreign "extremists" threaten domestic security. Kirghiz president Askar Akaev, addressing a roundtable meeting on Central Asian security at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January 2000, for example, concluded that foreign terrorists training in Afghanistan and their spread of religious extremism to Central Asia "is one of the key factors that may influence stability and security in our region." 29 Also speaking at Davos, the Kazakh prime minister, Kasymzhomart Tokaev, added, "If Islamic radicalism spreads throughout Central Asia, all the peace plans will be endangered." 30 The
Tajik president, Emomali Rakhmonov, addressing foreign news agencies prior to his December 2002 trip to Washington, DC, reminded his American hosts that his country has long been on the "frontline" and that "it took the September 11 events for the world to realize the massive terrorist threat coming from the Afghan Tal Although at best a crude measure, these arrests demonstrate that foreign ideas of political Islam have taken hold in Central Asia. What these numbers do not establish, however, is why political Islam has won admirers in Central Asian society. Of course, the intent of these government pronouncements is to link the growth in political Islam with outside intervention. After all, if foreign meddling cannot be blamed, then Central Asian leaders would be forced to confront an alternative causal explanationthe domestic roots of Islamist opposition.
Variation and the Domestic Roots of Political Islam
Troubling for clash of civilizations and foreign intervention hypotheses, the local reality of Central Asian political Islam is considerably more complex than either theory would predict. Both the clash of civilizations and foreign intervention arguments are, at their roots, structural explanations for the rise of political Islam. As such, we would expect, all things equal, that these structures would have similar affects across Central Asia. That is, if political Islam were indeed, as Bernard Lewis argues, a response to encroaching Western secularism, we would expect this response to be more or less uniform across Islamic society. Similarly, if political Islam were a product of aid and proselytizing by radical foreign Islamists, we would expect political Islam to be strongest in those areas where foreigners enjoy the most freedoms. Neither of these predictions, however, is borne out by Central Asian reality. The Central Asian rejection of Western culture has been neither uniform nor complete. Neither, moreover, has the resonance of political Islam been most pronounced in those areas where foreign actors have been most free. Just the opposite has proven true; the growth of Islamist movements has been most marked among those postSoviet Central Asian states whose leaderships have most restricted foreigner intervention.
This does not mean, importantly, that conflicting cultures and foreign intervention have had no causal role on the spread of political Islam in Central Asia. Foreign ideas and proselytizing as well as a real uneasiness with Western consumer culture have indeed contributed to the popularity of Islamist movements in the region. Crucially, however, these structural variables have mediated a more salient and considerably more local reality-the domestic politics of individual Central Asian states. More specifically, I argue, Islamist movements in Central Asia are first and foremost a response to local authoritarian rule: the more authoritarian the state, the more pronounced political Islam will be in society.
The causal link between Islamist opposition and the degree of authoritarian rule might at first glance seem odd. Indeed, would not all opposition, not just Islamist opposition, increase as authoritarian rule increased? Curiously, in Central Asia, this has not been the case. Prodemocracy opposition groups, for example, have been most active in Kyrgyzstan, the least authoritarian of the Central Asian states. At the same time, the Islamist movement in Kyrgyzstan is arguably among the least active of all 
These varying forms of opposition, as I detail in section three, result from the varying natures of Uzbek and Kirghiz authoritarian rule. More specifically, domestic opposition groups adjust their strategies according to the degree of contestation allowed under a given authoritarian regime. In authoritarian states where limited contestation is allowed, where opposition groups can find voice in Parliament or in the press, these opposition groups are more likely to see their interests as best served by lobbying for incremental reform and liberalization within the existing institutional context. In totalitarian states, in contrast, where contestation is not allowed and where the opposition is fully disenfranchised from the political system, opposition movements are more likely to press for revolutionary change. 37 More specifically, the Islamist call to revolution will find greater resonance in highly authoritarian regimes that exclude all political competition within state institutions and the press than in states that, even to a limited extent, allow some contestation.
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The transitions literature, to the extent that it does address nondemocratic political outcomes, tends to lump these outcomes into a nondifferentiated residual category of "authoritarianism."
39 As I illustrate here in the case of Central Asia, however, nondemocratic states, like democratic states, vary and these variations have profound consequences. More specifically, I argue that variations in the type of authoritarian rule lead to variations in the nature of domestic political opposition.
Opposition movements gravitate to those strategies that they perceive as most effective. Democratic strategies are viable in authoritarian states that allow some degree of dialogue and contestation. Through dialogue and political contestation opposition movements can nurture the hope that, someday, they too may win power. In states where political contestation is brutally suppressed, however, opposition movements maintain no such hope. Instead, revolutionary change is seen as the only viable strategy for effecting political change. Thus, while the clash of civilizations and the intervention of foreign activists have, perhaps, provided the ideas and ideology of political Islam, the prominence of political Islam is by no means uniform across the region but, rather, varies in response to the local nature of authoritarian rule.
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Contestation and Political Islam in Central Asia
No Central Asian state is democratic. In its annual Freedom in the World Country Ratings, Freedom House has consistently rated all Central Asian states as not free. 41 Within this broad category of not free or not democratic, however, significant variation exists in the nature of authoritarian rule and, most important, in the extent of political contestation. For example, the Kirghiz and, more recently, the Tajik leaderships have been careful to allow the opposition some degree of voice, particularly in the national parliaments and in the news media. The Uzbek leadership, in contrast, has effectively barred the domestic opposition from all government offices, from national and local newspapers, and from the electronic media. As I next illustrate, these differing degrees of political contestation Significantly, however, the Kirghiz parliament, as well as the Kirghiz press, afford what, for Central Asia, is an admirable degree of political contestation. The Parliament, for example, while its formal powers pale in comparison to those of the president, nevertheless does provide a venue for competition and political dissent. Thus, of the thirty-three members of the 2000-2005 Parliament who expressed a party affiliation, more than one-third of these deputies belonged to the political opposition. 44 These opposition MPs, because they can criticize executive rule from within the formal institutions of state government, enjoy a political efficacy that their colleagues in Uzbekistan do not. Independent Kirghiz media outlets, moreover, ensure that this parliamentary opposition maintains a real voice in the national political debate.
This ability publicly to contest power has led to the Kirghiz opposition's investment in and its acceptance of existing state institutions. Given this investment, the Kirghiz political opposition has more often than not sought to achieve change from within the existing institutional framework rather than, as in the case of Islamist opposition in Uzbekistan, pressing for wholesale revolution. 45 Granted, publicly challenging executive rule has not been without risk; several Kirghiz oppositionists have been jailed for their activities. Even when behind bars, though, Kirghiz oppositionists are ensured a political influence that would be unimaginable in Uzbekistan. Parliament deputy Azimbek Beknazarov, to take one example, was imprisoned in January 2002 after repeatedly stating that the Kirghiz president's decision to cede disputed borderlands to China was tantamount to treason. 46 The state officially charged Beknazarov with "abuses of power," dating back to his work in the mid-1990s as a regional prosecutor. Challenging these official charges, both the speaker of the Kirghiz Parliament, Abdygany Erkebaev, and the U.S. Department of State concluded that Beknazarov's arrest was politically motivated. 47 More telling than the circumstances surrounding Beknazarov's arrest, however, is the wave of protest it sparked both in the Parliament and in Kirghiz society. As the Beknazarov example illustrates, Kirghiz opposition movements can effectively challenge authoritarian rule using the independent media and existing political institutions. Revolutionary, antiestablishment strategies, for example, the strategies of political Islam, are, as a result, of little attraction to mainstream Kirghiz opposition. This is not to say, however, that Islamist movements do not exist in Kyrgyzstan. Indeed, political Islam has made inroads among some portions of Kirghiz society.
The Kirghiz government estimates that five thousand members of the radical Hizb ut-Tahrir Islamist party are active in southern Kyrgyzstan. 51 Like other governments in Central Asia, Russia, and Germany, the Kirghiz government has banned Hizb ut-Tahrir because of the group's extremist views. Nevertheless, the radical group remains active, and, in 2000, one hundred fifty of its members were temporarily detained. 52 In 2001 this number increased to four hundred. 53 In the first eight months of 2003, the Kirghiz state began investigations into a further 1,650 Islamist "agitators." 54 The overwhelming majority of these arrests and investigations have been concentrated in the Fergana Valley, among the Uzbek populations of the Jalalabad and Osh.
Of course, incarceration rates alone do not establish that Islamist movements have gained in popularity. The level of Islamist opposition, for example, may have remained constant between 1999 and 2002 while the Kirghiz state simply became more aggressive in its pursuit of perceived agitators. Hizb ut-Tahrir and other Islamist opposition groups, alas, do not release their member lists. As such, establishing a definitive measure of changes in the Islamist opposition is difficult. Nevertheless, despite these imperfect measures, that Islamist opposition movements have gained more support among Kyrgyzstan's minority Uzbek population is increasingly clear. Just as cross-state variations in political Islam in Central Asia can be explained by differences in the nature of authoritarianism, so too is within-state variation the product of local differences in autocratic rule. More directly stated, the Akaev regime proved far less welcoming of minority Uzbek political contestation than it has been of ethnic Kirghiz contestation.
Kyrgyzstan's minority Uzbek's are disproportionately underrepresented in state institutions. Ethnic Uzbeks held only 5 out of the 2000-2005 Parliament's 105 seats, and the Uzbek language, unlike Russian, is not an official state language-this despite the fact that Uzbeks, who constitute more than 20 percent of the Kirghiz population, are a larger minority Survey data, moreover, further document a growing sense of alienation and disenfranchisement among the Uzbek population. As the data on freedom of speech reveal, Kyrgyzstan's southern Uzbeks, the population that has been most drawn to political Islam, clearly sense that their ability to openly oppose the Kirghiz state has eroded in recent years. In 1999, for example, 80 percent of Uzbeks surveyed reported that they enjoyed freedom of speech. Three years later, this number had dropped to 50 percent.
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Given this growing sense of alienation combined with their underrepresentation in the national parliament, that Southern Kyrgyzstan's Uzbek population is attracted to the antiestablishment ideology of political Islam is understandable. Authoritarian rule is more severe for Kyrgyzstan's ethnic Uzbeks than it is for the titular population. Accordingly, ethnic Uzbeks, with few opportunities to achieve political change from within existing political institutions, are increasingly drawn to revolutionary groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, to Islamist movements that seek to overthrow of the state.
These mixed outcomes-little Islamist opposition among the broader titular population and growing Islamist opposition among minority Uzbeks-illustrate the local logic of political Islam. In Kyrgyzstan the resonance of political Islam varies at the substate level. In regions where meaningful contestation is absent, people turn to revolutionary ideologies. In regions where the opposition can contest politics through existing institutions, revolutionary ideologies find less support. The Kirghiz case demonstrates, in short, that the strength of the Islamist opposition varies inversely with political contestation. vote. 59 Moreover, in addition to being excluded from organs of state power, the opposition is also denied a voice in the national media. Describing this absolute state control over the press, the Geneva-based media watchdog, Cimera, writes, "Despite the large number of newspapers and a relatively developed electronic media network, there is not a single independent newspaper, television or radio station that can offer an alternative view to that of official news and analysis." 60 It is not only the opposition, however, that is denied a voice in Uzbekistan. Members of nongovernmental organizations and human rights groups are also intimidated and denied legal status. In April 2001, Tashkent police committed Elena Urlaeva, a member of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, to a psychiatric hospital. 61 At the time of her arrest, Urlaeva was organizing protests against the rerouting of a city road through private homes in Tashkent. 
Uzbekistan-Totalitarian Rule and Militant Islam
Conclusions and Implications
Hours after the March 2004 Tashkent bombings, U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher condemned the attacks as a "senseless act of violence" and emphasized the "importance of continued cooperation against those who would stop at nothing to achieve their misguided goals." 72 If the logic outlined in this essay is correct, however, one must question the extent to which continued cooperation with oppressive regimes like Uzbekistan furthers stability and limits the spread of militant Islam. 
